

# **East coast tidal surge 5<sup>th</sup> December 2013**

## **Lincolnshire's Response**

Lincolnshire Resilience Forum  
March 2014

# A year that started with 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of 'Great Storm' of 1953 ...

*... prompt for the current generation*



# ... ended with largest surge since, and greatest test of responders

- ➔ 5.2metre surge (>70cm than '53)
- ➔ 18-20 km defences overtopped
- ➔ 4 breach locations
- ➔ 720 properties flooded
- ➔ 1,700 hectares agricultural land inundated
- ➔ Natural environment damaged
- ➔ Boston Stump & Gibraltar Point damaged
- ➔ £8.1m worth of damage to infrastructure



## Overview of the storm ...

From mid-December to early February, the UK experienced a spell of extreme weather as a succession of major winter storms brought widespread impacts to the UK.


**On 5<sup>th</sup> December** - deepening pressure system combining with high astronomical tides and strong to gale force winds generate 'tidal surges'

Earliest assessments were for 'wave overtopping and spray' but risk of breaches *significantly* increased on Thursday as height of surge predicted to reach top of defences

Weather patterns at time of surge were 'chaotic' ...


# FLOODFORECASTINGCENTRE

a working partnership between  Environment Agency |  Met Office



**Wednesday 4<sup>th</sup>**


‘Flood Alerts’ issued at 6pm



**Thursday 5<sup>th</sup>**

‘Flood Warnings’ issued at 8.50am

‘Severe Flood Warnings’ (Danger to Life) issued at 2.30am



**Friday 5<sup>th</sup>**

Concern re open breach in Boston


# Unprecedented number of ‘severe flood warnings’

Location	Forecast Level (pm Thursday 5 Dec)	Past High Levels
North Shields	3.6	3.67 ('53)
Whitby	3.8	3.70 ('53) 3.66 ('83)
Hull	5.4	4.95 ('53)
<b>Immingham (Lincolnshire's reference point)</b>	<b>4.9 (actual 5.2metres)</b>	<b>4.7 ('78) 4.83 ('83)</b>
Great Yarmouth	2.8	2.8 ('07) 2.67 ('93)
Harwich	3.4	4.02 ('78)
Southend	4.1	4.68 ('53)
Sheerness	4.7	4.9 ('53)
Rye	5.0	4.93 ('95)



# Flood warning areas at risk

**Boston FWAs - BOS1A and BOS1B**  
Created December 2013



Scale 1:10,000



— Main River

— Boston FWAs

■ 053FWTBOS1A

■ 053FWTBOS1B


Created by the Modelling and Hydrology Team, Lincoln

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# Historical flooding in same area

Historic Flood Extent Map - January 1978 on the River Witham Boston  
Created December 2013



Scale 1:10,000



- Main River
- January 1978 on the River Witham Boston

Created by the Partnerships & Strategic Overview Team  
Lincoln


# Flooding in Lincolnshire

(This slide is marked 'OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE')

Impacts were largely consistent with predictions made by EA as early as the Wednesday ...

... Tidal Trent flooded, as did parts of coastline ...

But main impacts in Boston



# Challenges in Lincolnshire

- ➔ Learning from surge, and 'St Jude' storm, in October
- ➔ Affecting everyone from Northumbria to Kent – 'national' coordination required
- ➔ Ensuring planning and response 'proportionate' to risk?
- ➔ Although lower 'likelihood' than everywhere else! ... we anticipated increasing risk & activated contingency planning
- ➔ Flood rescue capability significantly enhanced in recent years
- ➔ Everyone to our north reporting (live) higher than predicted surges!
- ➔ First use of social media during emergency – BBC embedded in CEC continued to work well
- ➔ Additional challenge of Lincoln Christmas Market (200,000 visitors) and a major power cut in Lincoln (including CEC!)

# Response in Lincolnshire

Three key strategies;

- ➔ Pre-deploying assets (including 'preserving' assets on the coast, and accessing specialist resources)
- ➔ Removing people from danger, and
- ➔ Protecting the infrastructure and essential services ...

*... saves lives!*

# Response in Lincolnshire

- ➔ EA assessment gave 3 x evacuation scenarios;
  - » 600 (likely)
  - » 18,000 (possible)
  - » 36,000 properties 'at risk' ('worse-case')
- ➔ 'Required time' versus 'available time' was against us
- ➔ Deployed 2 multi-agency 'surge task-forces' to Boston & Louth
- ➔ Planning assumption that 15% would need help
- ➔ Evacuation 'hub' in Boston and 2 x 'strategic' evacuation centres (Commercial & MOD); care homes and hotels used for VPs;
- ➔ Capacity for 2,000 in Lincs; Neighbouring counties on 'stand by'
- ➔ 30 buses available over 2 days
- ➔ Identification of vulnerable persons and vulnerable assets
- ➔ Port of Boston, Pilgrim Hospital, Black Sluice Gate, Boston Stump ... all 'at risk'

# Impacts in Lincolnshire

- ➔ Vulnerable people moved well in advance (but, only those we know about – some did not get help)
- ➔ High area for HMO and migrant workers
- ➔ 203 people, from 78 different households, received assistance to evacuate (13.5%)
- ➔ Numerous more self-evacuated
- ➔ We don't know how many stayed 'in-situ' (we know some ignored warnings)
- ➔ 44 people and 2 pets were rescued
- ➔ Far too many people exposed themselves to risk at flood walls
- ➔ 607 residential properties flooded (majority in Boston where only 50% had insurance)
- ➔ 121 businesses flooded



## Boston, Lincolnshire – 5 Dec 2013



## Boston (6.12.13) - 350 tonnes flood contaminated waste disposed



## Boston Stump flooding – 5 Dec 2013

The most expensive sandbag!



**Seal Sands, Billingham – 7 Dec 2013**




## Immingham Docks – 6 Dec 2013 09:48 GMT




## Mablethorpe – 20m of sand-dune lost

## Boston, Lincolnshire – 6 Dec 2013



## Boston, Lincolnshire – 6 Dec 2013




# Properties flooded since the start of December 2013




Approximate numbers of properties flooded (Environment Agency figures)  
 Early December (Coastal): 1,400  
 Late December: 1,400  
 January: 638  
 Map Compiled:  
 12 January 2014 10h23

- January 2014
- Late December 2013
- Early December 2013 Coastal Floods



# Track of, and isobars of 1953 storm relative to 5<sup>th</sup> December 2013



Red line track & low pressure pattern of **1953 storm**

Blue dashed line is low pressure centre track **5-6 Dec 2013**

# Comparison of East Coast Surges

	January 1953	December 2013
Breaches	120 major	4 major
Properties flooded	24,000	1,400
Deaths	307	0 (but 2 killed due to high winds inland)
Agricultural Land flooded	65,000 hectares	6,800 hectares
People evacuated	32,000	18,000
Infrastructure	2 Power stations 12 Gas Works 100 miles of roads 200 miles of rail	Major impacts at Immingham Port  No power stations and major gas works/services affected
Flood Warnings	0	64 severe flood warnings Over 160,000 warning messages sent directly to homes and businesses

# In the circumstances ... a very good, forecast-led, response and recovery

We were ...

- **Better protected** (by and large the defences and drainage system did their job)
- **Better prepared** (we certainly got ahead of the surge and responded well to a late developing threat)
- Households, businesses and key partners were **better informed** as a result of accurate forecasting and flood warnings

**However**, we were lucky (favourable wind – no persistent rain). This was not an event on scale of 1953 storm ... **but it was a very useful and timely reminder!**”

# Lessons learned ...



- Capacity and resilience of partners tested to limit
- Welfare and rotation of responders (command and operational)
- Need for a secure, web-based, information sharing platform to improve communication
- Better cross border communication with EA re the Trent
- Identifying and supporting vulnerable people (good and bad experiences)
- Management and coordination of 'emergent' volunteers
- Non-emergency services ability to deliver capabilities 'out of hours'
- Evacuation planning (especially roles & responsibilities)
- We must continue to invest in resilience and maintain our critical services as category 1 & 2 responders (in alliances)
- We must continue to invest in protection and vulnerability reduction